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Abstract
The Bologna process aims at creating a European Higher Education Area where inter-
country mobility of students and staﬀ, as well as workers holding a degree, is facilitated.
While several aspects of the process deserve wide public support, the reduction of the length
of the first cycle of studies to three years, in several continental European countries where
it used to last for four or five years, is less consensual. The paper checks the extent of
public confidence in the restructuring of higher education currently underway, by looking
at its implications on the demand for academic programs. It exploits the fact that some
programs have restructured under the Bologna process and others have not, in Portugal.
Precise quantification of the demand for each academic program is facilitated by the rules of
access to higher education, in a nation-wide competition, where candidates must list up to
six preferences of institution and program. We use regression analysis applied to count data,
estimating negative binomial models. Results indicate that the programs that restructured
to follow the Bologna principles were subject to higher demand than comparable programs
that did not restructure, as if Bologna were understood as a quality stamp. This positive
impact was reinforced if the institution was a leader, i.e. the single one in the country that
restructured the program. Still an additional increase in demand was experienced by large
programs that restructured to oﬀer an integrated master degree, thus conforming to Bologna
principles while not reducing the program duration.
Keywords: education policy; European Higher Education Area; economic, social and cul-
tural integration; count data.
JEL codes: I28, I21, F15.
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1 Introduction
The Bologna process is a far-reaching reform, involving currently 45 countries,
which aims at the creation of an European Higher Education Area by 2010. Major
steps in that direction, currently underway, include the creation of a comparable
structure of academic degrees, mutual recognition of diplomas and course units,
the assessment of academic institutions and programs based on common quality
standards, and direct incentives to geographical mobility of students and staﬀ.
Implementation of a common structure of academic degrees means that some con-
tinental European countries are having to move from a four- or five-year first cycle
of studies into a shorter three-year one, which led to controversy. On one hand, the
advantages of having a degree recognized in a wider geographical space are praised,
together with the redevelopment of curricula that makes learning more student-
centered and enables entering the labor market earlier. On the other hand, distrust
has been expressed over the academic contents and adequacy to labor market needs
of the competencies transmitted in a shorter three-year program, with fears that
the employability of graduates will be reduced, when compared to graduates of
the longer cycle.
This study aims at checking the degree of public confidence in the restructuring
of the first cycle of higher education studies currently underway under the Bologna
process. More precisely, we concentrate on the reaction of students, to analyze the
change in demand for academic programs by candidates to the first cycle of higher
education, comparing programs that have already restructured to those that have
not.
We take advantage, first of all, of the legal setting in Portugal, where institutions
were given the option to adjust their academic programs to the Bologna curricula
starting in the academic year 2006/07, or to defer adjustment to one of the two
following years. Therefore, in 2006/07 a group of early implementers coexists with
a group of programs that still have not undergone change, and students are free to
choose where they would like to be admitted. Secondly, the analysis is facilitated by
the system of access to higher education in Portugal. Candidates must clearly rank
1
up to six choices of institution and academic program, and a national competition
follows, run by the Ministry of Education, which allocates candidates based on
their relative performance and the number of available vacancies posted by each
institution for each program. Thirdly, we have a good dataset on the application
process, which renders this analysis feasible.
Section 2 describes the main characteristics of the Bologna process. Section
3 explains its implementation in Portugal, clarifying how it provides good condi-
tions for economic analysis, and describes the system of access to higher education.
Section 4 presents the data set and section 5 describes the method and major prob-
lems to be tackled. Section 6 discusses the results, before concluding comments
are presented.
2 The Bologna process
The Bologna process aims at creating a European Higher Education Area, where
internal mobility of students, teachers, and administrative staﬀ is facilitated, whose
competitiveness attracts students from outside and contributes to the broader aim
of turning Europe into a leading knowledge-based society. The main pillars of the
process include:
• Comparability of the degree structure, based on three cycles: the bachelor
degree (three years, according to the dominant model), the master (normally
two years), and the doctorate.
• Mutual recognition of degrees, other awards, and course units. Further to a
comparable degree structure, a system of academic credits was created, whose
accumulation and transferability across countries is guaranteed, enabling mu-
tual recognition of degrees, other academic qualifications, and periods of study
abroad. In the same line, a Diploma Supplement was introduced, which de-
scribes the degree and qualifications obtained, in terms of workload, level,
and learning outcomes. The overall aim is to improve transparency of higher
education degrees and to render more flexible progression into further stud-
ies and access to the labor market, while improving the attractiveness of the
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European higher education system.
• Assessment and accreditation of institutions and academic programs based
on shared quality standards and procedures.
• Development of mobility programs by student, teaching, research and admin-
istrative staﬀ, including measures such as the portability of national loans
and grants.
• External dimension of the process, through exchange and cooperation with
other parts of the world (for example, Latin American and the Caribbean).
Major steps in the definition of this strategy were taken in Ministerial Con-
ferences at Sorbonne 1998, Bologna 1999, Prague 2001, Berlin 2003, and Bergen
2005.
Even though the process is far-reaching and multifaceted, much attention has
been devoted to the changes in the degree structure. Indeed, according to the
model that predominated in several continental European countries, the first higher
education degree was obtained after four to five years of successful study. There-
fore, the curricula changes necessary to bring the first degree down to three-years
are being implemented amidst some controversy.
On one hand, the advantages of having a comparable degree structure are
stressed, as the system becomes more transparent and obstacles to the mobil-
ity of students and workers are reduced. However, the new curricula are often
interpreted as a compressed version of the longer courses, and critics claim that
there will not be enough time for assimilation, reflection and a critical approach
to learning, which will undermine the quality of the degree. Under these circum-
stances, the employability of the new graduates might be reduced, when competing
with graduates from the previous system of a longer first cycle. Moreover, there is
the fear that public funding will be restricted to the first (three-year) cycle, thus
imposing a higher burden on students if they want to progress beyond the first
degree, when compared to the system that used to guarantee public funding for
four or five years.
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The relevance attached to this issue varies across scientific fields, with the prob-
lem usually not raised in the humanities, while it is highlighted in several countries
for occupations regulated by professional bodies (Reichert and Tauch, 2005: 13)
and subject to specific European Union coordination mechanisms (see the case of
architecture and health sciences).
Between optimism and scepticism, it is not certain how the behavior of stu-
dents and labor market agents will change during the period of adjustment to the
Bologna changes in higher education curricula.
3 The Portuguese setting
3.1 Implementation of the Bologna curriculum changes
Portugal subscribed to the Bologna declaration in 1999. The process was regulated
by national legislation on the quality of higher education (in 2003), on the credit
and classification systems, the Diploma Supplement, and other instruments for
geographical mobility (in 2005). Like in other continental European countries,
the restructuring of the system of degrees, with the reduction of the length of the
first cycle of studies, was one of the more debated changes. In fact, the common
duration of a higher education degree used to be in Portugal five years, until
1997, when it was reduced to four years; the Bologna process further imposes a
reduction to three years, translated into general national legislation in 2005 and
further regulated in 2006.
There is nevertheless the possibility to keep the duration of a program longer.
Whereas the first cycle (licenciatura) has a normal duration of three years and
the second cycle (mestrado) has a normal duration of one and a half or two years,
in special cases it is feasible to oﬀer a combined degree, the so-called integrated
master, lasting for five to six years.
Institutions could choose to start implementing the Bologna changes to the
program curricula in the academic year of 2006/07 or one of the two following
years.1
1Changes taking eﬀect in 2006/07 had to be sent to the Government until March 31, 2006, and changes to
take eﬀect in 2007/08 have to be sent until November 15, 2006.
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This restructuring of curricula was received with the mixture of optimism and
scepticism previously highlighted in the general description of the Bologna process.
As a result, diﬀerent higher education institutions adopted diﬀerent strategies in
terms of the starting year chosen to adopt the new system, in a framework of
increasing competition to attract students. Some saw the prompt implementation
of the Bologna changes as an opportunity to establish or reinforce a reputation of
an up-to-date institution, whose graduates would benefit from the opportunities
of a wider labor market. Institutions taking the lead might gain a comparative
advantage over the late-comers, not just attracting more applicants in the first year
after restructuring, but also gaining a reputation beneficial for future years. Other
institutions, instead, opted to delay the process, arguing that changes should be
thought over, and that the labor market would penalize the graduates from the
new shorter first cycle.
For example, the Academic Senate of the University of Coimbra adopted a
general rule deferring to 2007/08 the adoption of the new model (with exceptions
authorized for programs on which a national consensus for change had been reached
among institutions). This decision contrasted to that of Universidade Nova de Lis-
boa, which moved ahead restructuring most of its programs, even before national
legislation regulating the process was passed.
In this framework, with a group of institutions and programs clearly aﬀected
by the Bologna restructuring of the first cycle of studies, and a control group,
not adopting that model, students may themselves have opted for contrasting
strategies. Some may associate Bologna with a quality stamp and a guarantee of
recognition of the degree in a wider geographical space, yielding better employment
opportunities, whereas others may attach a higher reputation to a more established
older program.
Under this setting, Portugal provides favorable conditions to test the degree of
public understanding or trust in the Bologna process. In particular, candidates
to a higher education degree will be the agent we consider, and their demand
for university programs the precise indicator under scrutiny, contrasting programs
that have adjusted to the Bologna process with those that have not yet.
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This analysis is rendered feasible by the fact that admission into higher edu-
cation in Portugal is strictly regulated and implemented through a nation-wide
competition, where candidates must clearly state their preferences for institutions
and academic programs. Demand can thus be quantified in an unequivocal way.
3.2 Access to higher education
Public higher education comprises in Portugal the University and Polytechnic sys-
tems.2 This study concentrates on the University subsystem, given that it has a
more homogenous set of rules in the national competition to allocate students.
Enrollment in higher education is limited by a system of numerus clausus. The
number of vacancies is defined yearly by each institution, subject to communication
to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education.3 The application
process takes place at the centralized national level. Each candidate ranks up to
six priorities, each comprising a pair institution/program. The nation-wide com-
petition that follows allocates the candidates based on their grade point average
and the stated ranking of preferences.
Successful completion of secondary education is a prerequisite for admission
into higher education by students younger than 23 years.4 In addition, candidates
must pass national admission exams. Definition of the number of exams, their
subjects, the minimum classification required, the weighting scheme to compute
the final grade point average, and the minimum grade point average required, rests
with each institution.5 In any case, the number of exams required must be one or
two, and the computation of the final grade point average (expressed in a scale of
0 to 200) for ranking the applicants to each institution and program must obey
the following rules: the grade point average at completion of secondary school,
which takes into consideration the three final years of secondary school, must have
a weight of at least 50 percent; the specific national admission exam(s) must have
2As well as the military and police institutions.
3Who can, under special circumstances, change the proposal. For a few programs, joint approval by this
Ministry and a second one is required.
425 years old, until 2005. Older candidates who do not hold a secondary school degree are subject to a diﬀerent
set of exams specific to each program.
5In special cases where physical, vocational or other abilities are relevant, other specific admission requirements
may apply (pre´-requisitos).
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a weight of at least 35 percent.6
Certain admission exams are known to place tougher requirements on the ap-
plicants. Traditionally hard subjects are: mathematics, where only 26% of the
students obtained in 2006 a passing grade (27% in 2005, and 31% in 2004 and
2003); physics, where the share of students passing the exam was 30%, 47%, 37%,
and 22%, respectively in 2006, 2005, 2004, and 2003; and chemistry, where those
shares were, respectively, 35%, 52%, 41% and 53%.
The allocation of candidates comprises two major phases: the first one takes
place in July; the second takes place in August and includes the vacancies that
have not been filled in the first phase. Students who were not successful in the
first phase, or who were successful but wish to change the institution/program
where they were placed, and those who had not applied in the first phase (either
because they did not yet fulfill all the requirements or because, though fulfilling
the requirements, had decided not to apply), are eligible to apply in the second
phase.7
4 Data set
The data used is made publicly available by the Ministry of Science, Technology
and Higher Education, on a web site of the Department of Higher Education
(DGES) dedicated to announce the results of the allocation of candidates to higher
education programs.8
Data for the academic years 2003/2004 until 2006/2007 have been collected.
The following variables are available: overall demand for each program (total
number of students listing the pair institution/program among their preferences,
irrespective of its ranking), as well as the number of students who have selected
each program as their first choice, second choice and so forth (up to a maximum
6If other special requirements apply, they cannot be attached a weight larger that 15 percent.
7In the first phase, there is a small share of vacancies on which specific kinds of candidates are given pref-
erence: handicapped individuals, Portuguese emigrants returning home, those under a military work contract
(contingentes especiais), and those coming from specific regions (Azores or Madeira islands). In the case of Poly-
technic schools, further priority is assigned to candidates living in the geographic area of influence of the school
(prefereˆncia regional) or those having completed specific tracks that are more work-oriented, in the secondary
education (prefereˆncias habilitacionais). Institutions where vacancies remain after the second phase may decide
to have a third phase, run at the institution level.
8Direcc¸a˜o Geral do Ensino Superior, at http://www.acessoensinosuperior.pt.
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of six that can be listed); number of vacancies available for each program in each
of the two stages of the application process; national admission exams required by
the program, with the major ones being mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology
and portuguese; the field of study of the program.9
The appendix provides descriptive statistics on the dataset.
5 Model under estimation
The dependent variable in our model is a nonnegative integer: the demand for
university programs, i.e the number of candidates who choose the program. The
distribution of the variable is skewed to the left. As such, an adequate tool to
model the process is the count data regression analysis. Given the panel structure
of the data, we considered both the fixed eﬀects Poisson and the negative bino-
mial regression models, to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity across
academic programs.
From the descriptive statistics we learn that the dependent variable shows raw
overdispersion. This indicates that the negative binomial regression model might
be more appropriate for our data, since it relaxes the hypothesis of equal mean and
variance, which we tested by comparing both models through a likelihood ratio
test. The results indeed indicate clearly that the negative binomial model is more
appropriate and therefore we just report its results.10
The negative binomial model with fixed eﬀects is specified as
Pr (Yit = yit|δi) = Γ (λit + yit)
Γ (yit)Γ (yit + 1)
µ
1
1 + δi
¶λit Ã δi
1 + δi
!yit
(1)
where yit is the count for our dependent variable for the ith group (academic
program) in period t, λit = exp(xitβ), δi is the dispersion parameter, and xit is a
vector of regressors. This specification assumes constant dispersion within groups,
equal to 1+ δi. The mean and variance of yit are defined as δiλit and δiλit (1 + δi),
9We have consistently used the classification adopted by the Ministry in 2006, which includes ten areas:
agriculture, architecture, natural sciences, law and social sciences, economics and business, sports and arts,
education, humanities, health, and technologies.
10Results of the Poisson model are available from the authors upon request.
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respectively.11
The vector of regressors xit, the program attributes, includes whether it requires
a national admission exam in a particular subject (dummy variables for mathemat-
ics, physics, chemistry, biology and portuguese) and its scientific field (captured by
9 dummy variables, interacted with year dummy variables). We moreover control
for the phase of the application process, with a dummy variable equal to one in the
second phase. Given sharp diﬀerences in the dimension of the diﬀerent programs
and across diﬀerent institutions, we must also control for the size of the program
(number of vacancies posted). The crucial variable, Bologna06, achieves the value
one if the program was restructured to adapt to the Bologna principles, and zero
otherwise.
Controlling for the subjects required as admission exams is particularly relevant.
Indeed, a generally poor performance in the admission exam in a certain subject
reduces the size of the population that can potentially apply to programs requiring
that exam.
Also, diﬀerent scientific fields reacted diﬀerently to the implementation of the
Bologna process (consider for example the contrast between humanities and other
fields). Estimation of the model including field-specific eﬀects can control for these
diﬀerences.
Two alternative concepts are used to quantify the demand for each program at
an institution12:
• Hits: number of applicants who placed that program in that institution among
their choices (irrespective of its ranking, from first to sixth).
• First choice: number of applicants who placed that institution and program
as their first choice.
Three alternatives were used to define the group aﬀected by the Bologna cur-
riculum changes, to capture diﬀerences in the extent to which a program can be
11The estimation of the fixed eﬀects negative binomial regression model was implemented through conditional
maximum likelihood using the Stata command xtnbreg.
12The comments on the distribution of the dependent variable, made at the beginning of this section, apply to
either variable.
9
aﬀected as a result of having been restructured (intuitively, it would be like having
diﬀerent intensities of treatment):
• Bologna implementer: a program at an institution, which has been restruc-
tured according to the Bologna process.
• Bologna leader: a Bologna implementer that was the only institution in the
country that restructured that program. This group corresponds to the early-
implementers, who made an early move expecting to gain from its timing. It
is a group more likely to be aﬀected (either gaining or losing) by the change,
since candidates wishing to enter this program can choose to go for a Bologna
program or not.
• Bologna implementer without shortening the duration of the program (inte-
grated master): the possibility used by some institutions to restructure a pro-
gram while nevertheless keeping a duration longer than the normal Bologna
duration for the first cycle is explicitly taken into account. We distinguish
between programs that reduced their duration and those that, though hav-
ing restructured to conform to the Bologna principles, oﬀer a joint first and
second cycle degree, thus keeping a longer duration.
Comparison of the first and last specifications allows in particular to check the
relevance attached by candidates to the stamp associated with Bologna and its
reputation, and to the change in the duration of the program.
The diﬀerent alternatives used to quantify demand and to define the aﬀected
group provide robustness checks on our results. Nevertheless, several potential
problems must still be tackled by the empirical specification. First of all, there
could have been endogenous adoption on the new academic model. The timing
and extent of adaptation to the Bologna principles may be viewed as a political
decision by the institutions, who may self-select into restructuring promptly or
delaying adjustment, based on, among other factors, expectations about demand
for their programs. Our specification controls for this possibility, as it includes
program-specific fixed eﬀects. These program-specific eﬀects may capture factors
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other than its strategy, such as the amount of resources, reputation, or regional
conditions.
Moreover, the time trend in demand may be diﬀerent across programs oﬀered by
diﬀerent institutions. If so, the impact captured may reflect underlying trends tak-
ing place across programs irrespective of the adoption of the Bologna changes. For
example, in a framework of increasing competition among institutions to attract
students, it is likely that universities perceived as having lower quality will suﬀer
declining demand, irrespective of whether they implement the Bologna restructur-
ing. To control for this possibility, we will consider also the pre-intervention period.
We will therefore repeat the exercise, checking whether the aﬀected group (pro-
grams that underwent change in 2006), were already before that period subject to
diﬀerent demand. This specification can thus provides an answer to the question:
If no change in the curricula had taken place, would we nevertheless have seen a
diﬀerent trend in demand for the programs that adopted the Bologna changes in
2006 and those that did not? We would expect the estimated coeﬃcient on the
Bologna variable for 2005 and its interactions to be statistically non-significant.
6 Impact of the Bologna process
Table 1 reports on the estimation of alternative specifications of the model, in every
case using the variable hits to quantify the demand for a program, i. e. the total
number of candidates that list the program among their preferences, irrespective
of its rank position.
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Table 1: Demand for academic programs (total number of
students choosing the program), negative binomial model
Variable Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Size of program (vacancies) .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Bologna06 .13∗∗∗ .145∗∗∗ .222∗∗
(.041) (.041) (.104)
Bologna06 * size program 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
Exam:
maths -.401∗∗∗ -.464∗∗∗ -.459∗∗∗
(.046) (.047) (.047)
physics -.358∗∗∗ -.327∗∗∗ -.357∗∗∗
(.092) (.094) (.094)
chemistry -.157∗∗ -.092 -.118∗
(.07) (.07) (.071)
biology -.443∗∗∗ -.457∗∗∗ -.46∗∗∗
(.055) (.055) (.055)
portuguese .123∗∗ .103∗ .09∗
(.05) (.053) (.054)
Phase 2 -1.055∗∗∗ -1.061∗∗∗ -1.065∗∗∗
(.016) (.016) (.016)
Year:
2004 -.218∗∗∗ -.467∗∗∗ -.469∗∗∗
(.017) (.04) (.04)
2005 -.252∗∗∗ -.535∗∗∗ -.539∗∗∗
(.017) (.044) (.044)
2006 -.264∗∗∗ -.432∗∗∗ -.465∗∗∗
(.021) (.057) (.074)
Field of study * year no yes yes
Bologna06 * field study:
agriculture -.229
(.206)
law, social sc. -.164
(.122)
architecture -.371∗∗
(.157)
natural sc. -.256∗
(.139)
economics, business -.087
Continued on next page...
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... table 1 continued
Variable Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
(.139)
sports, arts .218
(.211)
education .341∗
(.199)
health -.058
(.262)
technologies .184
(.123)
N 3745 3745 3745
N-g 665 665 665
LL -13868.21 -13766.12 -13748.34
g-avg 5.6 5.6 5.6
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. (Standard errors in parentheses). N
is the number of observations, N-g is the number of groups institution/program, LL stands
for log-likelihood, and g-avg is the average number of observations per group.
As expected, larger programs (posting more vacancies) are subject to larger
demand. The demand for a higher education program is strongly aﬀected by the
performance of the candidates in the national admission exams. Indeed, require-
ment of an entry exam on biology, mathematics, physics or chemistry lowers the
demand for the program. Controlling for the second phase of the application
process is relevant since, as described in section 3.2, this is a residual phase, for
vacancies not previously filled and students who were not placed in the first phase
or who wish to be placed elsewhere. Therefore, the second phase gathers, quite
naturally, a remarkably lower number of applications. Overall demand for uni-
versity programs declined in 2004 (relative to 2003, the omitted category) and it
remained stable ever since (note that the estimated coeﬃcients for the years 2004
onwards are not significantly diﬀerent).
Programs that restructured to follow the Bologna principles were subject to an
increase in demand, when compared to programs that did not restructure. Indeed,
those that restructured were subject to 13% higher demand (see specification 1).
This eﬀect takes place irrespective of the dimension of the program (see the mag-
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nitude of the coeﬃcient on the number of vacancies interacted with the Bologna
dummy variable). The previous result is robust to the introduction (in specifi-
cation 2) of controls for the diﬀerent trend over time in demand across scientific
fields.
Specification 3 further allows the impact of the adoption of the Bologna princi-
ples to be heterogenous across scientific fields. This is particularly relevant if one
keeps in mind that diﬀerent areas welcomed with diﬀerent degrees of enthusiasm or
skepticism the changes. The findings in column 3 indicate that in humanities (the
omitted category), restructuring of the programs according to the Bologna process
was associated with a 22% increase in demand (see the coeﬃcient on the overall
Bologna dummy); that impact was not significantly diﬀerent for programs in law,
economics, health, sports and arts, and agriculture. The impact was negative for
programs in the architecture area13, whereas it was statistically insignificant in
the natural sciences (as the sum of the coeﬃcients on this dummy and the overall
Bologna dummy is not statistically diﬀerent from zero). Education was unequiv-
ocally the area in which candidates perceived the Bologna changes as most of an
opportunity, as suggested by the sharp increase in demand.
Table 4 in appendix reports comparable results considering as dependent vari-
able the number of applicants who ranked the program as their first choice only.
Specifications 1 and 2 report findings very similar to the previous ones: having
restructured to follow Bologna is associated with a 11% to 14% increase in the de-
mand for a program. Specification 3 highlights the positive impact of the Bologna
restructuring on the first choice of programs by candidates in the fields of education
and technologies.
We further checked whether the impact of the Bologna process could be diﬀer-
ent, depending on the intensity of the changes. First of all, we considered whether
being a national leader in a certain program implementing the Bologna curricula
is associated with some benefit (or penalty) in terms of demand by prospective
students. Secondly, we checked whether restructuring to oﬀer a joint first and
second cycle degree (the so-called integrated master) of a longer duration yields
13Which includes not just strictly architecture, but also programs such as design.
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some benefit in terms of demand.
In table 2, specification 4 indeed reveals that being a leader in the implementa-
tion of the Bologna curricula changes led to an increase in demand for a program,
above the increase experienced by Bologna implementers in general. This eﬀect
holds irrespective of the size of the program.
Specification 5 considers the impact of restructuring to oﬀer an integrated mas-
ter program. Results indicate that there was indeed a positive impact on demand
for programs that restructured and kept a long duration, above the impact for
Bologna implementers in general; however, this increase in demand took place
only for large programs.
Once we check jointly the impact of being a Bologna leader and the impact of
having restructured to oﬀer a long integrated master program (specification 6),
the previous results hold: national leaders in the adaption of the curricula to the
Bologna principles attracted more applicants than Bologna changers in general,
and a further increase in demand was directed at large programs that became an
integrated master under the Bologna setting.
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Table 2: Demand for academic programs (total num-
ber of students choosing the program), including Bologna
leader and integrated master variables, negative binomial
model
Variable Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6
Size of program (vacancies) .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Bologna06 .19∗ .256∗∗ .221∗∗
(.106) (.105) (.107)
Bologna06 * size program 0∗∗ -.002∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
(.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Bologna leader .155∗∗ .152∗
(.079) (.079)
Bologna leader * size program -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001)
Integrated master .015 .03
(.099) (.1)
Integrated master * size program .002∗∗ .002∗∗
(.001) (.001)
Exam:
maths -.461∗∗∗ -.456∗∗∗ -.458∗∗∗
(.047) (.047) (.047)
physics -.364∗∗∗ -.349∗∗∗ -.358∗∗∗
(.094) (.093) (.094)
chemistry -.115 -.117∗ -.115∗
(.071) (.071) (.071)
biology -.46∗∗∗ -.46∗∗∗ -.46∗∗∗
(.055) (.055) (.055)
portuguese .089∗ .089∗ .087
(.054) (.054) (.054)
Phase 2 -1.067∗∗∗ -1.067∗∗∗ -1.068∗∗∗
(.016) (.016) (.016)
Year:
2004 -.469∗∗∗ -.468∗∗∗ -.468∗∗∗
(.04) (.04) (.04)
2005 -.54∗∗∗ -.539∗∗∗ -.54∗∗∗
(.044) (.044) (.044)
2006 -.466∗∗∗ -.465∗∗∗ -.465∗∗∗
(.074) (.074) (.074)
Field of study * year yes yes yes
Bologna06 * field study:
Continued on next page...
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... table 2 continued
Variable Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6
agriculture -.246 -.27 -.288
(.206) (.206) (.206)
law, social sc. -.168 -.151 -.161
(.123) (.123) (.123)
architecture -.398∗∗ -.399∗∗ -.434∗∗∗
(.158) (.159) (.16)
natural sc. -.264∗ -.263∗ -.275∗∗
(.139) (.139) (.139)
economics, business -.09 -.068 -.07
(.139) (.139) (.139)
sports, arts .143 .208 .124
(.215) (.211) (.215)
education .318 .359∗ .311
(.204) (.199) (.204)
health -.076 -.241 -.269
(.261) (.267) (.268)
technologies .172 .11 .088
(.124) (.134) (.135)
N 3745 3745 3745
N-g 665 665 665
LL -13746.45 -13744.99 -13743.11
g-avg 5.6 5.6 5.6
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. (Standard errors in parentheses). N
is the number of observations, N-g is the number of groups institution/program, LL stands
for log-likelihood, and g-avg is the average number of observations per group.
Table 5 in appendix shows results of the same specifications, considering as
dependent variable the number of candidates who chose the program as their
first option only. Results highlight that the impact of the Bologna changes was
more pronounced in education and technologies, while being a leader or having
restructured to become an integrated master does not yield a significant impact
on the first option listed by candidates.
One final issue remains to be tackled, that of checking if the impact we are cap-
turing was indeed a result of the Bologna changes or a trend taking place anyhow,
due to factors other than Bologna, which would have taken place even if the pro-
gram had not been restructured. We therefore run the previous models including a
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new variable, Bologna05, which assumes the value 1 in the year 2005 (previous to
the implementation of any Bologna changes) for the programs that later (in 2006)
were restructured. We expect the estimated coeﬃcients on this variable and its
interactions to be non-significant, meaning that programs implementing Bologna
in 2006 were not subject to a diﬀerent trend in demand already before that period.
Table 3 adds this variable and its interactions to the final specification in table 1
(calling it specification 7) and to the specifications in table 2 (specifications 8 to
10).
Table 3: Demand for academic programs (total number of
students choosing the program), including Bologna 2005
variable, negative binomial model
Variable Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10
Size of program (vacancies) .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Bologna06 .224∗∗ .193∗ .259∗∗ .225∗∗
(.107) (.109) (.108) (.11)
Bologna06 * size program -.001∗∗∗ 0∗∗ -.002∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
(.0005) (.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Bologna leader .151∗ .148∗
(.079) (.078)
Bologna leader * size program -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001)
Integrated master .015 .029
(.098) (.099)
Integrated master * size program .002∗∗ .002∗∗
(.001) (.001)
Bologna05 .009 .008 .01 .009
(.101) (.101) (.101) (.101)
Bologna05 * size program .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
Exam:
maths -.46∗∗∗ -.462∗∗∗ -.457∗∗∗ -.459∗∗∗
(.047) (.047) (.047) (.047)
physics -.358∗∗∗ -.365∗∗∗ -.35∗∗∗ -.358∗∗∗
(.094) (.094) (.094) (.094)
chemistry -.118∗ -.115 -.117∗ -.116∗
(.071) (.071) (.071) (.071)
biology -.46∗∗∗ -.46∗∗∗ -.459∗∗∗ -.459∗∗∗
Continued on next page...
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... table 3 continued
Variable Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10
(.055) (.055) (.055) (.055)
portuguese .089∗ .088 .087 .086
(.054) (.054) (.054) (.054)
Phase 2 -1.065∗∗∗ -1.067∗∗∗ -1.068∗∗∗ -1.069∗∗∗
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016)
Year:
2004 -.469∗∗∗ -.469∗∗∗ -.469∗∗∗ -.469∗∗∗
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
2005 -.542∗∗∗ -.543∗∗∗ -.542∗∗∗ -.543∗∗∗
(.048) (.048) (.048) (.048)
2006 -.466∗∗∗ -.467∗∗∗ -.466∗∗∗ -.467∗∗∗
(.074) (.074) (.074) (.074)
Field of study * year yes yes yes yes
Bologna06 * field study:
agriculture -.26 -.275 -.302 -.318
(.213) (.213) (.213) (.213)
law, social sc. -.158 -.163 -.147 -.156
(.126) (.127) (.126) (.127)
architecture -.376∗∗ -.4∗∗ -.404∗∗ -.437∗∗∗
(.164) (.165) (.165) (.166)
natural sc. -.265∗ -.271∗ -.272∗ -.283∗∗
(.144) (.144) (.144) (.144)
economics, business -.036 -.039 -.017 -.019
(.145) (.145) (.144) (.145)
sports, arts .213 .14 .203 .121
(.228) (.233) (.228) (.233)
education .436∗∗ .415∗∗ .453∗∗ .407∗
(.206) (.21) (.205) (.21)
health -.049 -.064 -.223 -.25
(.276) (.275) (.279) (.28)
technologies .226∗ .214∗ .151 .13
(.127) (.128) (.137) (.138)
Bologna05 * field study:
agriculture -.116 -.111 -.118 -.112
(.204) (.204) (.204) (.204)
natural sc. -.032 -.027 -.035 -.03
(.143) (.143) (.143) (.143)
architecture -.017 -.013 -.017 -.014
(.159) (.159) (.159) (.159)
Continued on next page...
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... table 3 continued
Variable Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10
economics, business .171 .17 .169 .169
(.142) (.142) (.142) (.142)
sports, arts -.015 -.014 -.016 -.016
(.264) (.264) (.264) (.264)
education .292 .295 .292 .294
(.21) (.21) (.21) (.21)
law, social sc. .014 .013 .01 .01
(.121) (.121) (.121) (.121)
health .008 .013 .031 .034
(.267) (.266) (.265) (.265)
technologies .132 .132 .131 .131
(.118) (.118) (.118) (.118)
N 3745 3745 3745 3745
N-g 665 665 665 665
LL -13742.13 -13740.31 -13738.68 -13736.88
g-avg 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
χ2(11) 12.67 12.54 12.86 12.72
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. (Standard errors in parentheses). N is the number of
observations, N-g is the number of groups institution/program, LL stands for log-likelihood, and g-avg is the average
number of observations per group. The χ2
(11)
is the joint test on the Bologna 2005 variable and its interactions.
It is reassuring to find that, as expected, belonging to the aﬀected group of
programs before the restructuring was implemented, did not have any significant
impact on the demand for a degree. Table 3 indeed shows that the coeﬃcients
on the Bologna05 variable and its interactions are non-significant. Therefore, the
demand for Bologna and non-Bologna degrees was not undergoing diﬀerent trends
before the institutional changes were implemented, pointing to the validity of the
exercise we performed.
7 Conclusion
We have checked the impact on the demand for academic programs resulting from
the remarkable changes in the curricula currently taking place under the Bologna
process. The relevance of the issue follows from the mix of enthusiasm and some
criticism that these changes have raised, in countries where the first cycle of higher
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education used to last for four or five years and is now reduced to a normal duration
of three years. Analysis of the issue is feasible in Portugal, since the procedure of
application to higher education takes place at the centralized national level and
candidates must clearly list their preferences in terms of programs and institutions.
We explored the fact that in the academic year 2006/07, some programs underwent
restructuring, whereas other did not.
Results clearly indicate that programs that changed their curricula to conform
with the Bologna principles were subject to an increase in demand by prospective
students. That positive impact on demand was more pronounced if the institution
took the lead, being the only institution in the country that restructured the
program. We also found that large programs that changed their curriculum to
oﬀer an integrated master, thus conforming to the Bologna principles while not
reducing the duration of the program, were subject to a further increase in demand.
Moreover, we have confirmed that the impact we are capturing is not due to trends
taking place irrespective of the adoption of the Bologna principles. Indeed, our
tests indicate that the demand for Bologna and non-Bologna degrees was not
undergoing diﬀerent trends before the institutional changes were implemented.
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Table 4: Demand for academic programs (number of stu-
dents choosing the program as their first choice), negative
binomial model
Variable Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Size of program (vacancies) .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Bologna06 .111∗∗ .143∗∗∗ .054
(.049) (.05) (.137)
Bologna06 * size program 0∗ 0∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
(.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Exam:
maths -.599∗∗∗ -.626∗∗∗ -.621∗∗∗
(.063) (.063) (.063)
physics -.317∗∗∗ -.323∗∗∗ -.364∗∗∗
(.115) (.118) (.118)
chemistry -.1 -.037 -.06
(.096) (.097) (.097)
biology -.644∗∗∗ -.654∗∗∗ -.648∗∗∗
(.071) (.072) (.072)
portuguese .104 .072 .044
(.066) (.069) (.069)
Phase 2 -.897∗∗∗ -.898∗∗∗ -.902∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Year:
2004 -.214∗∗∗ -.483∗∗∗ -.48∗∗∗
(.02) (.055) (.055)
2005 -.26∗∗∗ -.523∗∗∗ -.526∗∗∗
(.021) (.059) (.059)
2006 -.281∗∗∗ -.498∗∗∗ -.454∗∗∗
(.026) (.076) (.094)
Field of study * year no yes yes
Bologna06 * field study:
agriculture -.244
(.293)
law, social sc. .082
(.156)
architecture -.172
(.196)
natural sc. -.223
(.186)
Continued on next page...
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... table 4 continued
Variable Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
economics, business .074
(.174)
sports, arts .121
(.271)
education .772∗∗∗
(.234)
health -.117
(.333)
technologies .435∗∗∗
(.163)
N 3745 3745 3745
N-g 665 665 665
LL -9461.225 -9399.144 -9379.973
g-avg 5.6 5.6 5.6
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. (Standard errors in parentheses). N
is the number of observations, N-g is the number of groups institution/program, LL stands
for log-likelihood, and g-avg is the average number of observations per group.
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Table 5: Demand for academic programs (number of stu-
dents choosing the program as their first choice), includ-
ing Bologna leader and integrated master variables, neg-
ative binomial model
Variable Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6
Size of program (vacancies) .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Bologna06 .065 .077 .088
(.139) (.138) (.14)
Bologna06 * size program -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
(.0006) (.0007) (.0008)
Bologna leader -.061 -.054
(.097) (.097)
Bologna leader * size program .001 .002
(.002) (.002)
Integrated master .097 .1
(.121) (.123)
Integrated master * size program .001 .002
(.001) (.001)
Exam:
maths -.621∗∗∗ -.616∗∗∗ -.616∗∗∗
(.063) (.063) (.063)
physics -.363∗∗∗ -.362∗∗∗ -.359∗∗∗
(.118) (.118) (.118)
chemistry -.061 -.06 -.061
(.097) (.097) (.097)
biology -.648∗∗∗ -.648∗∗∗ -.648∗∗∗
(.072) (.072) (.072)
portuguese .042 .043 .04
(.069) (.069) (.069)
Phase 2 -.9∗∗∗ -.904∗∗∗ -.902∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Year:
2004 -.48∗∗∗ -.48∗∗∗ -.48∗∗∗
(.055) (.055) (.055)
2005 -.526∗∗∗ -.525∗∗∗ -.526∗∗∗
(.059) (.059) (.059)
2006 -.454∗∗∗ -.454∗∗∗ -.454∗∗∗
(.094) (.094) (.094)
Field of study * year yes yes yes
Bologna06 * field study:
Continued on next page...
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... table 5 continued
Variable Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6
agriculture -.239 -.309 -.308
(.293) (.294) (.294)
law, social sc. .08 .091 .085
(.157) (.156) (.157)
architecture -.17 -.214 -.224
(.198) (.198) (.201)
natural sc. -.224 -.225 -.23
(.186) (.186) (.186)
economics, business .077 .089 .093
(.174) (.174) (.174)
sports, arts .146 .111 .123
(.277) (.272) (.278)
education .76∗∗∗ .782∗∗∗ .747∗∗∗
(.242) (.234) (.241)
health -.106 -.345 -.345
(.335) (.343) (.344)
technologies .436∗∗∗ .326∗ .315∗
(.163) (.176) (.177)
N 3745 3745 3745
N-g 665 665 665
LL -9379.601 -9377.576 -9376.9
g-avg 5.6 5.6 5.6
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. (Standard errors in parentheses). N
is the number of observations, N-g is the number of groups institution/program, LL stands
for log-likelihood, and g-avg is the average number of observations per group.
25
Table 6: Demand for academic programs (number of stu-
dents choosing the program as their first choice), includ-
ing Bologna 2005 variable, negative binomial model
Variable Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10
Size of program (vacancies) .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Bologna06 .079 .092 .102 .115
(.141) (.143) (.142) (.144)
Bologna06 * size program -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
(.0006) (.0006) (.0007) (.0008)
Bologna leader -.066 -.059
(.096) (.096)
Bologna leader * size program .002 .002
(.002) (.002)
Integrated master .095 .098
(.12) (.121)
Integrated master * size program .001 .002
(.001) (.001)
Bologna05 .097 .098 .097 .098
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.13)
Bologna05 * size program .00004 .00002 .00006 .00004
(.0006) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Exam:
maths -.625∗∗∗ -.625∗∗∗ -.62∗∗∗ -.62∗∗∗
(.063) (.063) (.063) (.063)
physics -.362∗∗∗ -.361∗∗∗ -.36∗∗∗ -.357∗∗∗
(.118) (.119) (.118) (.118)
chemistry -.063 -.065 -.063 -.065
(.098) (.098) (.097) (.097)
biology -.65∗∗∗ -.65∗∗∗ -.65∗∗∗ -.65∗∗∗
(.072) (.072) (.072) (.072)
portuguese .038 .036 .037 .034
(.069) (.069) (.069) (.069)
Phase 2 -.903∗∗∗ -.901∗∗∗ -.906∗∗∗ -.903∗∗∗
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Year:
2004 -.482∗∗∗ -.482∗∗∗ -.482∗∗∗ -.482∗∗∗
(.055) (.055) (.055) (.055)
2005 -.547∗∗∗ -.548∗∗∗ -.547∗∗∗ -.548∗∗∗
(.066) (.066) (.066) (.066)
2006 -.461∗∗∗ -.461∗∗∗ -.46∗∗∗ -.461∗∗∗
Continued on next page...
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... table 6 continued
Variable Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10
(.094) (.094) (.094) (.094)
Field of study * year yes yes yes
Bologna06 * field study:
agriculture -.297 -.292 -.361 -.36
(.302) (.302) (.302) (.302)
law, social sc. .071 .069 .079 .073
(.161) (.162) (.161) (.162)
architecture -.239 -.238 -.28 -.291
(.204) (.206) (.206) (.208)
natural sc. -.212 -.213 -.215 -.22
(.192) (.193) (.192) (.193)
economics, business .08 .082 .095 .099
(.18) (.18) (.18) (.18)
sports, arts .125 .154 .114 .13
(.29) (.296) (.291) (.296)
education .712∗∗∗ .698∗∗∗ .721∗∗∗ .686∗∗∗
(.246) (.253) (.246) (.253)
health -.156 -.145 -.377 -.377
(.355) (.356) (.361) (.362)
technologies .496∗∗∗ .498∗∗∗ .388∗∗ .378∗∗
(.168) (.168) (.18) (.182)
Bologna05 * field study:
agriculture -.199 -.2 -.201 -.201
(.279) (.279) (.279) (.279)
natural sc. .031 .029 .029 .028
(.184) (.184) (.184) (.184)
architecture -.23 -.232 -.23 -.232
(.198) (.198) (.198) (.198)
economics, business .003 .003 .002 .003
(.174) (.174) (.174) (.174)
sports, arts -.017 -.013 -.019 -.014
(.301) (.3) (.301) (.3)
education -.223 -.225 -.223 -.225
(.272) (.272) (.272) (.272)
law, social sc. -.05 -.049 -.052 -.051
(.151) (.151) (.151) (.151)
health -.131 -.133 -.125 -.125
(.308) (.308) (.307) (.307)
Continued on next page...
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... table 6 continued
Variable Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10
technologies .189 .189 .188 .189
(.152) (.152) (.152) (.152)
N 3745 3745 3745 3745
N-g 665 665 665 665
LL -9371.509 -9371.066 -9369.098 -9368.335
g-avg 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
χ2(11) 16.95 17.09 16.98 17.15
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. (Standard errors in parentheses). N is the number of
observations, N-g is the number of groups institution/program, LL stands for log-likelihood, and g-avg is the average
number of observations per group. The χ2
(11)
is the joint test on the Bologna 2005 variable and its interactions.
Table 7: Summary statistics
Variable Mean or Pct. Std. Dev.
Demand: number of hits 139.1 207.8
Demand: first option 31.9 61.7
Bologna06 0.116 0.32
Bologna leader 0.05 0.218
Integrated master 0.02 0.141
Phase 2 0.49
Size of the program (vacancies) 32.7 39.7
Exams:
maths 0.377
physics 0.046
chemistry 0.083
biology 0.111
portuguese 0.083
Field of study:
agriculture 0.054
architecture 0.070
natural sciences 0.131
law, social sciecnes 0.148
economics, business 0.073
sports, arts 0.033
education 0.078
humanities 0.154
health 0.042
technologies 0.217
N 3745
28
Most Recent Working Papers 
 
 
NIPE WP 4/2007 
Cardoso, Ana Rute; Portela, Miguel; Sá, Carla; Alexandre, Fernando; 
“Demand for higher education programs: the impact of the 
Bologna process”, 2007. 
NIPE WP 3/2007 Aguiar-Conraria, Luís and Yi Wen, “Oil Dependence and Economic 
Instability, 2007. 
NIPE WP 2/2007 
Cortinhas, Carlos, “Exchange Rate Pass-Through in ASEAN: 
Implications for the Prospects of Monetary Integration in the Region”, 
2007. 
NIPE WP 8/2006 
de Freitas, Miguel Lebre, Sobre a perda de ímpeto no processo de 
convergência da economia portuguesa: uma abordagem dogmática, 
2006.  
NIPE WP 7/2006 
Aguiar-Conraria, Luís; Gulamhussen, Mohamed Azzim and 
Aguiar, Sandra; “Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil and Home 
Country Risk”, 2006.  
NIPE WP 6/2006 
Veiga, Francisco José and Veiga, Linda Gonçalves, “The impact of 
local and national economic conditions on legislative election results?”, 
2006.  
NIPE WP 5/2006 Veiga, Linda Gonçalves and Veiga, Francisco José, “Does 
Opportunism Pay Off?”, 2006.  
NIPE WP 4/2006 
Ribeiro, J. Cadima and J. Freitas Santos, “An investigation of the 
relationship between counterfeiting and culture: evidence from the 
European Union”, 2006.  
NIPE WP 3/2006 Cortinhas, Carlos, “Asymmetry of Shocks and Convergence in 
Selected Asean Countries: A Dynamic Analysis”, 2006.  
NIPE WP 2/2006 Veiga, Francisco José, “Political Instability and Inflation Volatility”, 
2006 
NIPE WP 1/2006 
Mourão, Paulo Reis, The importance of the regional development on 
the location of professional soccer teams. The Portuguese case 1970-
1999, 2006. 
NIPE WP 17/2005 
Cardoso, Ana Rute and Miguel Portela, The provision of wage 
insurance by the firm: evidence from a longitudinal matched 
employer-employee dataset, 2005. 
NIPE WP 16/2005 Ribeiro, J. Cadima and J. Freitas Santos, Dilemas competitivos da empresa nacional: algumas reflexões, 2005. 
NIPE WP 15/2005 Ribeiro, J. Cadima and J. Freitas Santos, No trilho de uma nova política regional, 2005. 
NIPE WP 14/2005 Alexandre, Fernando, Pedro Bação and Vasco J. Gabriel, On the Stability of the Wealth Effect, 2005. 
NIPE WP 13/2005 Coelho, César, Francisco José Veiga and Linda G. Veiga, Political Business Cycles in Local Employment, 2005. 
 
